Poland, The District Court in Rzeszów, 3 September 2020, No. IV U 856/20
Case overview
Country
Case ID
Decision date
Deciding body (English)
Deciding body (Original)
Type of body
Type of Court (material scope)
- Administrative Court
- Civil Court
Type of jurisdiction
Type of Court (territorial scope)
Instance
Area
Further areas addressed
Outcome of the decision
Link to the full text of the decision
General Summary
The appellant was refused the right to a stoppage benefit (świadczenie postojowe) by the decision of the Polish national social security authority (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w J.). The Court decided in favour of the appellant granting him the right to the stoppage benefit by using literal interpretation per favorem. As it had been emphasised, the appellant, as contractor, was not responsible for the delayed transfer of the application for the benefit of the principal.
Facts of the case
The contractor (the appellant) submitted an application for a stoppage benefit (świadczenie postojowe) to the principal in April 2020. The principal transferred the request to the national social security agency (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w J.) on July 20, 2020. In the decision of July 22, 2020 the authority refused the appellant the right to the benefit as all the conditions specified by Article 15zq paragraph 2 point 1 and paragraph 3 of the Act of March 2, 2020 on special solutions related to the prevention, counteraction, and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and the emergencies caused by them (here on out: the Covid Act) were not met.
The authority justified the decision stating that what was relevant was not when the contractor submitted the application but when the principal transferred it to the authority. That is the reason why the appellant, an employee since July 1, 2020 and on this basis subject to social insurance, did not meet the conditions specified in Article 15zq paragraph 5 of the Covid Act requiring that an applicant (in this case the appellant) cannot be subject to social insurance on any other basis on the day of submission. The appellant argued that he had applied for the stoppage benefit in April 2020, and that the principal "passed it on" later (July 20, 2020). He underlined that the principal had to be an intermediary between the contractor and the authority as the Covid Act did not provide any other means. In this case, due to a large number of requests, the transfer of the submitted application was delayed, rendering the appellant susceptible to the risk of not obtaining the stoppage benefit. Moreover, he argued that ‘transmission’ was solely a technical action and that the application was submitted at the same time when he submitted it to the principal.
Type of measure challenged
Measures, actions, remedies claimed
Individual / collective enforcement
Nature of the parties
Claimant(s)
Private individualDefendant(s)
Public
Type of procedure
Reasoning of the deciding body
According to Article 15zs paragraph 1 point 1 letter d of the Covid Act, the contractor was obliged to make a declaration of not being subject to social insurance on another basis when submitting his application and therefore the date of submission of the application should have been decisive in order to evaluate the prerequisites for granting the disputed benefit. Moreover, the principal, according to Article 15zq paragraph 1 point 2 of the Covid Act, could not refuse to transfer the submitted application. The exception to that rule was introduced by Article 15zs paragraph 2 of the Covid Act, according to which the contractor could have submitted the application himself. Nevertheless, the exception was not applicable to this case.
The Court concluded that the date of submission of the application and, consequently, the evaluation of the prerequisites for granting the stoppage benefit, should have been considered as the date of submission by the contractor (the appellant). The delayed transfer of the submitted application by the principal, due to the high number of requests submitted through him, should not have had negative consequences for the contractor, and should have been interpreted per favorem. Once the application was submitted, it did not affect its further proceeding and transferring. Consequently, the justification of the contested decision that since July 1, 2020 the appellant was subject to social insurance on another basis (as an employee) and hence did not meet all the conditions for granting the stoppage benefit was incorrect.
The Court came to the conclusion that the appellant was entitled to obtain the stoppage benefit on the date of the submission of the application to the principal, even though the transfer of the application to the authority was delayed. The appellant was not responsible for later proceedings and transferring of the submitted application to the authority.
Conclusions of the deciding body
The Court decided in favour of the appellant.
Fundamental Right(s) involved
Fundamental Right(s) instruments (constitutional provisions, international conventions and treaties)
- Art. 9, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
- Art. 22, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Art. 34 para. 1 and 3, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
- Art. 2, 20, 67 para. 2, Polish Constitution