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Israel, The Supreme Court of Israel sitting as High Court of Justice, 2 December 2021, HCJ 8196/21

Case overview

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Country
Israel
Case ID
HCJ 8196/21
Decision date
2 December 2021
Deciding body (English)
The Supreme Court of Israel sitting as High Court of Justice
Type of body
Court
Type of Court (material scope)
  • Administrative Court
  • Constitutional Court
  • State Court
Type of jurisdiction
Single jurisdiction system
Type of Court (territorial scope)
State Court
Instance
1st Instance
Area
Privacy and data protection
Further areas addressed
  • Private and family life
  • Health law, detention and prison law
  • Freedom of movement of people
  • Scope of powers of public authorities (legislative, executive etc.)
Outcome of the decision
Claim inadmissible or rejected
Link to the full text of the decision
Decision_HE available on www.supremedecisions.court.gov.il

Case analisys

General Summary

Due to the worldwide pandemic, the Israeli government decided to use technological ‎tracking means to help in epidemiological examinations to locate persons who had ‎tested positive for the novel coronavirus, as well as persons who came into close ‎contact with them. This petition is connected to two previous decisions on contact ‎tracing: HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (April 26, 2020) and HCJ 6732/20 ‎Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (March 1, 2021). The petition was ‎filed by four rights groups (nongovernmental organizations) seeking to repeal the ‎government's decision to temporarily reuse the phone tracking measure by the ISA ‎to locate confirmed or suspected carriers of the new (and potentially more ‎contagious) Omicron variant and stop its transmission.‎

The petitioners claim that according to previous judicial decisions on ISA ‎coronavirus location tracing (the previous petitions mentioned above), the ‎government cannot authorize the ISA tracking measures through emergency ‎regulations. Instead, they must do so through a parliamentary review procedure—‎either by limited review by the secret services subcommittee of a government ‎resolution or by a full deliberative parliamentary statutory legislative process. ‎

The court rejected the petition. They decided that the government decision about ‎the temporary Omicron emergency regulations (which were limited to five days), ‎did not violate the two previous judicial decisions and is not a disproportionate ‎infringement on the right to privacy.‎

Facts of the case

Since March 2020 (and during the first and the second waves of the coronavirus in ‎Israel) this controversial "tracking tool" has been used, authorized by government ‎emergency regulations. The ISA was allowed to collect and process “technological ‎information” regarding persons who have tested positive to the Omicron variant ‎during the 14 days prior to their diagnosis, for the purpose of identifying that ‎person’s route of movement and identifying the people who were in that person’s ‎close proximity during that period, so that the Ministry of Health could instruct them ‎to self-isolate at home. In late November 2021 a fifth coronavirus wave has started ‎in Israel, hence the government reinstated contact-tracing activities by the ISA to ‎track carriers of the Omicron variant of the coronavirus. ‎

Type of measure challenged
National government measure
Measures, actions, remedies claimed
  • Petition for a conditional order and an interim order
  • Annulment of the government decision to temporarily reuse the phone tracking ‎measure to locate confirmed or suspected carriers of the Omicron variant.‎
Individual / collective enforcement
Action brought by a qualified entity in the interest of a specific group of claimants for the purpose of collective redress measures such as damages or restitutions and annulment of the administrative decision.
Nature of the parties
  • Claimant(s)
    Private collective
  • Defendant(s)
    Public
Type of procedure
Expedited procedures
Reasoning of the deciding body

The Court ruled that the new government decision did not violate the two previous ‎judicial decisions. Additionally, the court explained thet in the current ‎circumstances of a short expiration term (the regulations were enacted as a limited ‎temporary five-day directive that was set to expire the day after the judicial ‎decision) and narrow scope of the regulations, and given the uncertainty surrounding ‎the threat of the new variant Omicron - emergency regulations can be in effect for a ‎five-day period. That's while statutory legislation is promoted (as the government ‎claimed). In response to arguments made by the petitioners regarding the limited ‎efficacy of the ISA Tool for location tracking, the court relied on classified data ‎presented to it ex parte. Given this data, as well as the limited temporal and personal ‎scope of the emergency regulations, the Court determined that the Omicron ‎emergency regulations are proportional to the invasion of the right to privacy.‎

Conclusions of the deciding body

The court rejected the petition.‎

Implementation of the ruling

A few hours after this judicial decision, the government stated that this measure will ‎not be renewed after it lapses that night.‎

Balancing Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Fundamental Right(s) involved
  • Right to data protection
  • Right to privacy
  • Right to private and family life
Fundamental Right(s) instruments (constitutional provisions, international conventions and treaties)
  • Right to privacy and to intimacy, stability of law, sec. 7,7(d), 8, 12‎, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty‎
  • Emergency regulations by the government during a state of emergency‎, sec. 39, 39(a), 39(c), 39(f), Basic Law
  • Extension of validity of enactments‎, sec. 38, Basic Law: the Knesset‎
  • Mission and functions of the Service, ‎5762-2002, sec. 7(b)(6)‎, General Security Service Law‎
Rights and freedoms specifically identified as (possibly) conflicting with the right to health
  • Health v. data protection
  • Health v. right to privacy (private and family life)
  • Health v. private life
General principle applied
  • Rule of law
  • Proportionality
  • State of emergency or necessity
  • Precautionary

Additional notes

Impact on Legislation/Policy

A few hours after this judicial decision the government decided not to extend the ‎emergency regulations any further (and meanwhile not to continue with the statutory ‎legislation process of authorizing the ISA to engage in location tracking of carriers ‎of the omicron variant).‎

Impact on national case law

This decision is a following petition of HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister ‎and HCJ 6732/20 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset, which are the two ‎more substantive decisions by the Israeli Supreme Court about contact tracing. ‎

Other notes

Instance: 1st Instance, Appellate on fact and law, Supreme court - Cassation (Review), Constitutional Review

Additional resources
Link_HE to www.supremedecisions.court.gov.il
Link_HE to www.supremedecisions.court.gov.il
Link_EN to www.lawfareblog.com
Authors of the case note
  • Dr. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Associate Professor‎, Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law
  • Shaiel Tchercansky, Research Assistant‎, Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law
Published by Chiara Naddeo on 20 June 2022

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